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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
SUN SURETY INSURANCE COMPANY, 
and DELFINO FERNANDEZ CADENA, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 20030354-SC 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court issued a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals; therefore, this 
Conn lus, jurisdiction • •* u ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the court of appeals lack jurisdiction to decide an appeal taken by a non-
party from a i ion-appealable order? 
2. Assuming that the court of appeals had jurisdiction to decide • inpe.-il did it 
nevertheless err by refusing to follow this Court's prior holdings that an agent's 
knowledge is ii i: lpi ited to il: lis pi it icipal? 
On certiorari, this Court will "'review the court of appeals' decision for 
correctness."' State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 12, 482 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (quoting State 
v.//a/we/i, 2002 UT 125^25, 63 PJd 650). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following statute whose text 
is reproduced in Addendum B: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-20b-101 to 104 (Supp. 2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After defendant failed to appear, the trial court initiated forfeiture proceedings 
resulting in a judgment forfeiting his appearance bond. R. 16, 23-24. The surety on the 
bond, Sun Surety Insurance Company ("Sun Surety"), moved to set aside the forfeiture 
order. R. 44-51. The trial court denied the motion. R. 68-69. Sun Surety appealed from 
the order denying its motion to set aside the forfeiture order. R. 74. The defendant did 
not appeal his conviction. See Record, generally. The court of appeals reversed. State v. 
Sun Surety Ins. Co., 2003 UT App. 55, f 6 (unpublished) (a copy of the case is attached 
as Addendum A). This Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sun Surety is an insurance company located in South Dakota. R. 11-12. Scott 
Candland is Sun Surety's agent, doing business as Bail Out Fast located in Salt Lake 
City. Id. Sun Surety, through Candland, issued an appearance bail bond for defendant. 
Id. Candland executed the bond and provided the required power of attorney. Id. 
When defendant failed to appear for his 16 January 2001 arraignment, the trial 
court commenced bail forfeiture proceedings. R. 14-17. Notice of defendant's 
nonappearance was mailed to Candland's place of business in Salt Lake City. R. 53. 
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When neither Sun Surety nor Candland produced defendant within the required six 
months, the tnal court entered a judgment forfeiting the bond on 26 July 2001. R. 23-24. 
Defei ldantwasar^* * -. fv to a charge »! 
attempted failure to stop at the command of a police officer on 21 August 2001. R. 34-
43. 
On 4 September 2001 Si n I Sui et) n io\ eci to set aside tl le jiidgn lei it on tl le sole 
ground that the bail forfeiture statute required notice of defendant's nonappearance to be 
mailed to Sun Surety rather than to Candland. R. 44-51. The trial court disagreed and 
denied, tl le n lotioi i fit idii lg that ,4sei < • ice :»! i t l le agei it is effect! i • e as serv ice on. the surety 
itself." R. 68-69 (a copy of the trial court's order is included as Addendum C), The 
order denying Sun Surety's motion to set aside the forfeiture was entered 9 October 2001. 
Id. ()i i 15 Octc •!: >ei 2001 line l iul i mill »niieiiiai defemlanl R 70 
Sun Surety timely appealed from the order denying its motion to set aside the 
forfeiture order. R. 74. The defendant did not appeal his conviction. See Record, 
general 1> I I: le ::c i n I: of appeals 1 leai d tl le appeal and rev ersed the trial court 's order 
denying Sun Surety's motion to set aside. Sun Surety, 2003 UT \pp, 55, at ^ 6, Add. A. 
S U M M A R Y OF A R G U M E N T 
I (I I ill il II kn l bond smvt\ is not .i \w\"\\ to J ruin tnal t ase, Fherefore, a surety 
cannot bring an independent, direct appeal of a bond forfeiture order. Rather, a surety 
must either bring its appeal in conjunction with the defendant's appeal of his conviction, 
or it 'iiitisi petition for .in cxthtottlnui •, w i il Because tl le defendant did not appeal his 
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conviction, Sun Surety's direct appeal was improper and the court of appeals lacked 
jurisdiction to decide it. 
Point II. Even if the court of appeals had jurisdiction to decide this appeal, it 
erred by refusing to follow this Court's holdings that an agent's knowledge is imputed to 
his principal. This Court has repeatedly upheld this fundamental agency law principle. 
In this case, Candland—the agent—received notice of defendant's failure to appear. 
Therefore, the court of appeals erred in refusing to impute Candland's knowledge to his 
principal, Sun Surety. 
The bail forfeiture statute does not modify fundamental agency law. Nothing in 
the statute indicates that the legislature intended to do so. On the contrary, the 
legislature's use of the term "surety" throughout the statute indicates that the legislature 
recognized and intended to incorporate fundamental agency law into the statute. 
Consequently, the court of appeals erred by refusing to interpret the bail forfeiture statute 
in harmony with this Court's precedents and fundamental agency law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS LACKED JURISDICTION TO 
DECIDE THIS CASE 
Utah courts have consistently held that a bail bond surety cannot bring an 
independent, direct appeal from a bond forfeiture order. See Heninger v. Ninth Circuit 
Court, 739 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah 1987) (citing People v. Tremayne, 3 P. 85 (1884)); 
Beehive Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Fifth District Court, 933 P.2d 1011,1012-13 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). "[A] bond forfeiture order is reviewable on appeal from a final judgment, but 
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standing alone, the order is not appealable." Heninger, 739 P.2d at 1109. "Bail forfeiture 
is not directly appealable where, as here, there is no appeal of the criminal convictions." 
Beehive Bail B< mt is, 933 P.2< 1; it 1012 13 (< :ttii lg Heninger, 739 r - d a: > * ••* i 
When a criminal defendant does not appeal his conviction, a surety seeking review 
of a bond forfeiture order must petition for an extraordinary writ. See Beehive Bail 
Bonds, I nc \, 933 P 2c 11 t/i 1012 13; Heningi 7 , 739 P 2d ; it 1109. For example, in 
Heninger, the bail bondsman brought a petition for extraordinary relief in district nil, 
challenging the circuit court's bond forfeiture order. 739 P.2d at 1109. The defendant 
circuit court argi I id that a petitioi i fori* extraordinary relief was not the proper avenue for 
reviewing the forfeiture order. Id. Rather, it argued that the bondsman hould ha\ o 
sought a "direct appeal of the forfeiture ruling . . . . " Id. This Court disagreed, holding 
tl lat a boi id forfeit Lire ordei , "standing alone is not appealable," Id, Because the 
defendants in Heninger did not appeal their convictions, the bondsman pi operl} pin sued 
the only available remedy: a petition for an extraordinary writ. Id. 
Neither Heninger nor Beehive Bail Bonds explicitly explain why a surety cannot 
bring an independent, direct appeal fron i a boi i, :! foi feit i ire ordei I he I loldings app< ?ai , 
however, to be based upon the principle that a non-party may not bring an independent, 
direct appeal. See Heninger, . n 09; Society of Professional Journalists v. 
Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah 1987); KUTV, Inc. v. Conder, 668 i' * M J , DI / 
(Utah 1983). 
For example, in KUTV, a criminal trial court entered an order enjoining the media 
from referring to a defendant as the "Sugarhouse rapist" or "•" ' P<^! • : ' ; 
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defendant's prior criminal activity. 668 P.2d at 515. KUTV petitioned this Court for a 
writ of prohibition directing the trial court to vacate its order. Id. at 516. This Court 
recognized that the non-party members of the news media had correctly pursued the only 
available avenue for obtaining appellate review of the trial court's order. See id. at 517. 
"Other than the requested writ, there [was] no other remedy" available to the non-party 
members of the media adversely affected by the criminal trial court's order. Id. 
Likewise, in Society of Professional Journalists, the Society sought public access 
to the competency proceedings in Ronald Lafferty's criminal trial. 743 P.2d at 1168. 
The trial court denied the Society's motion. Id. The Society then sought an 
extraordinary writ reversing the trial court's order denying public access. Id. In granting 
the writ this Court reconfirmed that a non-party can only obtain appellate review of a trial 
court's actions through a petition for extraordinary relief. Id. at 1172. "The very reason 
for seeking appellate review by way of a writ is because the petitioner was not a party 
below and cannot appeal." Id. (citing KUTV, 668 P.2d at 517). 
Like the members of the media in the above cases, a bail bond surety is not a party 
to the criminal case. See State v. Harrison, 2001 UT 33, f 30, 24 P.3d 936 (noting that 
the only parties to a criminal case are the State and the defendant). As a non-party, a 
surety cannot obtain independent, direct review of a bond forfeiture order. See Beehive 
Bail Bonds, Inc., 933 P.2d at 1012-13; Heninger, 739 P.2d at 1109. Rather, a surety must 
join its appeal with the defendant's appeal of his conviction, or it must petition for an 
extraordinary writ. Id. 
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In this case, defendant did not appeal his conviction. See Record, generally. 
Nevertheless, Sun Surety brought this appeal directly from the order denying its motion 
to set aside the forfeiture order. R. 74. Therefore, this independent, direct appeal by a 
non-party was improper. See Heninger, 739 P.2d at 1109; KUTV, 668 P.2d at 517. 
Because this appeal was improperly taken, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction 
to decide the case. "Where an appeal is not properly taken, [an appellate] court lacks 
jurisdiction and . . . must dismiss." Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, ^  8, 5 P.3d 649 
(citing A J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991)). 
Accordingly, this Court should vacate the court of appeals' decision and direct it to 
dismiss the case. See id. 
The State's earlier failure to challenge the court of appeals' jurisdiction does not 
prevent its current challenge. See Housing Authority v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, f 11, 44 
P.3d 724. "[(Questions regarding subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time 
because such issues determine whether a court has authority to address the merits of a 
particular issue." Id. (citing Thomas v. Lewis, 2001 UT 49, f 13, 26 P.3d 217). When 
considering a jurisdictional claim, this Court does not consider whether the claim was 
sufficiently preserved. See id. Therefore, this court may properly consider the State's 
current jurisdictional challenge. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION CONFLICTS WITH 
THIS COURT'S CONSISTENT HOLDINGS THAT AN AGENT'S 
KNOWLEDGE IS IMPUTED TO HIS PRINCIPAL 
Even if the court of appeals had jurisdiction, this Court should nevertheless 
reverse because the court of appeals' opinion conflicts with this Court's precedent. The 
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court of appeals refused to follow this Court's holdings that an agent's knowledge is 
imputed to his principal. 
This Court has consistently recognized the "well-established principle" of agency 
law that "'the knowledge of [an] agent concerning the business which he is transacting 
for his principal is to be imputed to his principal.'" See, e.g., Wardley Better Homes and 
Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, fflf 16-17, 19, 61 P.3d 1009 (quoting First Nat 7 Bank v. 
Foote, 42 P. 205, 207 (1895) (alteration in original)); Maoris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., 
2001 UT 43, f 21, 24 P.3d 984. As this Court recognized in Wardley, "[t]his rule is 
broad, encompassing 'all notice or knowledge relating to the subject-matter of the agency 
which the agent acquires or obtains while acting as such agent and within the scope of his 
authority.'" 2002 UT 99 at f 16 (quoting Latses v. Nick Floorf Inc., 104 P.2d 619, 623 
(Utah 1940) (emphasis in original) (additional quotations omitted)). 
The court of appeals' opinion conflicts with Wardley, and this Court's previous 
holdings on this issue, because it holds that an agent's knowledge is not imputed to his 
principal. See Sun Surety, 2003 UT App. 55 at ^ | 5-6. Sun Surety's only challenge to 
the sufficiency of the notice was that it was mailed to its agent's Salt Lake City address, 
rather than to its own South Dakota address. R. 48-49. It was undisputed that Sun 
Surety's in-state agent, Candland, received notice of the defendant's nonappearance. See 
Sun Surety, 2003 UT App. 55 at ffl[ 2, 5-6; R. 48-49, 53. Nevertheless, the court of 
appeals refused to follow this Court's prior decisions and impute Candland's knowledge 
to Sun Surety. See Sun Surety, 2003 UT App. 55 at fflf 5-6. 
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Common agency law principles apply even though this case involves 
interpretation of a statute. "The common law . . . so far as it was not repugnant to, or in 
conflict with . . . the constitution or laws of [Utah] . . . shall be the rule of decision in all 
courts of this state." UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-1 (2000). The legislature is presumed to 
be aware of the common law which existed before the enactment of a statute, and "absent 
an indication that the legislature intends a statute to supplant common law, the courts 
should not give it that effect." Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 
50.01 at 422 (4th ed. 1984). 
There is nothing in the language of the bail forfeiture statute to indicate that the 
legislature intended to supplant fundamental agency law. Although the statute designates 
"the surety" as the proper recipient for notice, it neither states nor implies that an agent's 
knowledge cannot be imputed to his principal. See § 77-20b-101 to 104 (Supp. 2003). 
Moreover, the legislature's reference to the "surety" in other portions of the statute 
indicates an intent to include both the agent bondsman and the principal surety company 
within the meaning of the term. For example, the statute consistently refers to the person 
who is to bring a fugitive defendant before the court as the "surety." See, e.g., § 77-20b-
101(4)(c)(i) (stating that a bond should be exonerated if "the surety has delivered the 
defendant to the county jail booking facility . . ."); § 77-20b-103(l) ("If a surety is unable 
to bring a defendant to the court. . ."); § 77-20b-104(1) ("If a surety fails to bring the 
defendant before the court..."). It is most often the in-state agent who would bring a 
fugitive defendant before the court, rather than the surety, who is often an out-of-state 
corporation, as in this case. Therefore, the statute recognizes and incorporates the 
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fundamental principle of agency law that an agent's acts and knowledge are attributable 
to his principal. See Wardley, 2002 UT 99 at fflf 16-17. Consequently, the notice 
provisions of the statute should be interpreted in harmony with fundamental agency law. 
Interpreting a bail forfeiture statute essentially identical to Utah's, the Washington 
Court of Appeals agreed that absent a clear legislative intent to the contrary, the statute 
did not alter fundamental agency law. See State v. Parada, 877 P.2d 231, 235-36 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1994). The Washington statute stated that "[i]f the surety is not notified by the 
court in writing of the unexplained failure of the defendant to appear . . . then the 
forfeiture shall be null and void." Id. at 235. Finding that the statute did not purport to 
alter fundamental agency principles, the court held that "[n]otice through an agent is 
sufficient to achieve the obvious purpose of the statute: to alert the surety that it needs to 
appear and defend its interests under the bond." Id. Utah's substantially identical statute 
should be similarly interpreted. 
In Wardley, this Court granted certiorari review and reversed the court of appeals 
because its opinion "overlooked . . . the well-established principle" of agency law that an 
agent's knowledge is imputed to his principal 2002 UT 99 at f^f 16-17. In Sun Surety, 
the court of appeals has again failed to recognize this fundamental principle. See Sun 
Surety, 2003 UT App. 55 at ff 5-6. The court of appeals' opinion in Wardley would have 
"dramatically alter[ed] agency law as it now exists." Id. at <|J 20. As it now stands, the 
court of appeals' opinion in Sun Surety has that same potential and should therefore be 
reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should vacate or reverse the court of appeals' opinion. 
Respectfully submitted this /> day of October 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on IC October 2003,1 mailed, postage prepaid, two 
accurate copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF PETITIONER to: 
David M. Cook 
452 East 3900 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107-1806 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
.' State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Sun Surety Insurance Company and Delfino Fernandez Cadena, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20010906-CA 
F I L E D 
(February 27, 2003) 
1 2003 UT App 55"] 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable William Barrett 
Attorneys: David M. Cook, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
David E. Yocom and Trina A. Higgins, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Davis. 
JACKSON, Presiding Judge: 
Appellant Sun Surety Insurance Company ("Sun") appeals the 
district court's denial of its Motion for Order to Set Aside 
Default Judgment and to Exonerate Bond. 
Sun challenges the district court's interpretation of the notice 
requirements contained in Utah Code Ann. § 77-20b-101 (2000) 
that allowed notice to the bail bondsman listed on the bond 
rather than to the surety. A district court's interpretation of 
a statute presents a question of law that we review for 
correctness. See Toone v. Weber County, 2002 UT 103,114, 57 P. 3d 
1079. Sun further challenges the district courtfs refusal to set 
aside the default judgment and exonerate the bond. "fA motion or 
action to modify a final judgment' . . . will be reversed only 
upon a showing of an abuse of discretion." Gillmqj: v._ Wright, 
850 P.2d 431, 434 (Utah 1993) (quoting Laub v. South Cent. Utah 
Tel^Ass/n, 557 p.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1982)). 
Sun argues that the plain language of section 77-20b-101 
requires notice to Sun, rather than to an apparent agent. We 
agree. Section 77-20b-101(1)(a) requires the court, upon 
issuance of a bench warrant, to "mail notice of 
nonappearance . . . [to] the surety who posted the bond." Id. 
Further, section 77-20b-101(3) provides "[i]f notice of 
nonappearance is not mailed to a surety . . . the surety is 
relieved of further obligation under the bond if the surety's 
current name and address are on the bail bond in the court's 
file." Id. 
"'When interpreting statutes, we determine the statute's meaning 
by first looking to the statute's plain language, and give 
effect to the plain language unless the language is ambiguous.'" 
Furthermore, "in construing a statute, [we] must assume that 
'each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory 
words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably 
confused or inoperable.1" 
Atlas Steel, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2002 UT 112,1119, 61 
P.3d 1053 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
The plain language of section 77-20b-101 requires notice to the 
surety whose name and address appear on the bail bond. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-20b-101(1), (3). Although both Sun's name and 
address and that of the bail bondsman appeared on the bond, it 
is clear from the face of the bond that Sun was the surety for 
the bond. Thus, section 77-20b-101 required notice to Sun, as 
surety, at its address rather than to the bondsman at his 
address. Further, without such notice, Sun "is relieved of 
further obligation under the bond." Id. § 77-20b-101 (3) . 
Thus, we conclude the trial court erred in interpreting section 
77-20b-101 to allow notice to the bail bondsman and not the 
surety listed on the face of the bond. We further conclude the 
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the 
default judgment against Sun and exonerate the bond. See Lund v. 
Brown, 2000 UT 75,19, 11 P.3d 277 ("A decision premised on 
flawed legal conclusions . . . constitutes an abuse of 
discretion."). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's denial 
of Sun's motion and remand for proceedings consistent with this 
decision. 
Norman H. Jackson, 
Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
ADDENDUM B 
Utah Code Ann. 
77-20B-101. ENTRY OF NONAPPEARANCE - NOTICE TO SURETY -
RELEASE OF SURETY ON FAILURE OF TIMELY NOTICE. 
(1) If a defendant who has posted bail fails to appear before the appropriate court 
when required and the court issues a bench warrant or directs that the surety be given 
notice of the nonappearance, the clerk of the court shall: 
(a) mail notice of nonappearance by certified mail, return receipt requested, within 30 
days to the address of the surety who posted the bond; 
(b) notify the surety of the name, address, telephone number, and fax number of the 
prosecutor; 
(c) deliver a copy of the notice sent under Subsection (l)(a) to the prosecutor's office 
at the same time notice is sent under Subsection (l)(a); and 
(d) ensure that the name, address, and telephone number of the surety is stated on the 
bench warrant. 
(2) The prosecutor may mail notice of nonappearance by certified mail, return receipt 
requested, to the address of the surety within 37 days after the date of the defendant's 
failure to appear. 
(3) If notice of nonappearance is not mailed to a surety, other than the defendant, in 
accordance with Subsection (1) or (2), the surety is relieved of further obligation under 
the bond if the surety's current name and address are on the bail bond in the court's file. 
(4) (a) A bond ordered forfeited by the court may not be reinstated without the 
mutual agreement of the surety and the court. 
(b) If the defendant is arrested and booked into a county jail booking facility pursuant 
to a warrant for failure to appear on the original charges, the surety may file a motion 
with the court to exonerate the bond. The surety shall deliver a copy of the motion to the 
prosecutor. 
(c) Unless the court makes a finding of good cause why the bond should not be 
exonerated, it shall exonerate the bond if: 
(i) the surety has delivered the defendant to the county jail booking facility in the 
county where the original charge is pending; 
(ii) the defendant has been released on a bond secured from a subsequent surety for 
the original charge and the failure to appear; 
(iii) after an arrest, the defendant has escaped from jail or has been released on the 
defendant's own recognizance, pursuant to a pretrial release, under a court order 
regulating jail capacity, or by a sheriffs release under section 17-22-5.5; or 
(iv) the surety has transported or agreed to pay for the transportation of the defendant 
from a location outside of the county back to the county where the original charge is 
pending, and the payment is in an amount equal to government transportation expenses 
listed in section 76-3-201. 
(d) Under circumstances not otherwise provided for in this section, the court may 
exonerate the bond if it finds that the prosecutor has been given reasonable notice of a 
surety's motion and there is good cause for the bond to be exonerated. 
(e) If a surety's bond has been exonerated under this section and the surety remains 
liable for the cost of transportation of the defendant, the surety may take custody of the 
defendant for the purpose of transporting the defendant to the jurisdiction where the 
charge is pending. 
77-20B-102. TIME FOR BRINGING DEFENDANT TO COURT. 
(1) If notice of nonappearance has been mailed to a surety under Section 77-20b-10l, 
the surety may bring the defendant before the court or surrender the defendant into the 
custody of a county sheriff within the state within six months of the date of 
nonappearance, during which time a forfeiture action on the bond may not be brought. 
(2) A surety may request an extension of the six-month time period in Subsection (1), 
if the surety within that time: 
(a) files a motion for extension with the court; and 
(b) mails the motion for extension and a notice of hearing on the motion to the 
prosecutor. 
(3) The court may extend the six-month time in Subsection (1) for not more than 60 
days, if the surety has complied with Subsection (2) and the court finds good cause. 
77-20B-103. DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY - NOTICE TO PROSECUTOR. 
(1) If a surety is unable to bring a defendant to the court because the defendant is and 
will be in the custody of authorities of another jurisdiction, the surety shall notify the 
court and the prosecutor and provide the name, address, and telephone number of the 
custodial authority. 
(2) If the defendant is subject to extradition or other means by which the state can 
return the defendant to the court's custody, and the surety gives notice under Subsection 
(1), the surety's bond shall be exonerated: 
(a) if the prosecutor elects in writing not to extradite the defendant immediately; and 
(b) if the prosecutor elects in writing to extradite the defendant, to the extent the bond 
exceeds the reasonable, actual, or estimated costs to extradite and return the defendant to 
the court's custody, upon the occurrence of the earlier of: 
(i) the prosecuting attorney's lodging a detainer on the defendant; or 
(ii) 60 days after the surety gives notice to the prosecutor under Subsection (1), if the 
defendant remains in custody of the same authority during that 60-day period. 
77-20B-104. FORFEITURE OF BAIL. 
(1) If a surety fails to bring the defendant before the court within the time provided in 
Section 77-20b-102, the prosecuting attorney may request the forfeiture of the bail by: 
(a) filing a motion for bail forfeiture with the court, supported by proof of notice to 
the surety of the defendant's nonappearance; and 
(b) mailing a copy of the motion to the surety. 
(2) A court shall enter judgment of bail forfeiture without further notice if it finds by 
a preponderance of the evidence: 
(a) the defendant failed to appear as required; 
(b) the surety was given notice of the defendant's nonappearance in accordance with 
Section 77-20b-101; 
(c) the surety failed to bring the defendant to the court within the six-month period 
under Section 77-20b-102; and 
(d) the prosecutor has complied with the notice requirements under Subsection (1). 
(3) If the surety shows by a preponderance of the evidence that it has failed to bring 
the defendant before the court because the defendant is deceased through no act of the 
surety, the court may not enter judgment of bail forfeiture. 
(4) The amount of bail forfeited is the face amount of the bail bond, but if the 
defendant is in the custody of another jurisdiction and the state extradites or intends to 
extradite the defendant, the court may reduce the amount forfeited to the actual or 
estimated costs of returning the defendant to the court's jurisdiction. A judgment under 
this Subsection (4) shall: 
(a) identify the surety against whom judgment is granted; 
(b) specify the amount of bail forfeited; 
(c) grant the forfeiture of the tail; and 
(d) be docketed by the clerk of the court in the civil judgment docket. 
(5) A prosecutor may immediately commence collection proceedings to execute a 
judgment of bond forfeiture against the assets of the surety. 
ADDENDUM C 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
DAVID S. WALSH, 3370 
Deputy District Attorney 
2001 South State Street #S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (801) 468-3422 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
DEFINO FERNANDEZ CADENA 
(aka Luis Cesar Zargoza), 
Defendant, 
And 
SUN SURETY INSURANCE COMPANY 
Surety. 
O R D E R 
Case No. 011900113 
Honorable William R. Barrett 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the Surety's Motion to 
Set Aside the Judgment entered on July 26, 2001. David S. Walsh represented 
the State of Utah. David M. Cook represented the Sun Surety. The court having 
considered the motion filed by the surety and after having heard argument by 
counsel, the court finds that service on the agent is effective as service on the 
surety itself. 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the surety's Motion to Set side the 
Judgment is hereby denied. 
DATED this / day of October, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
WILLIAM R. BARRETT 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 1 day of October, 2001, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid to: 
David M. Cook 
Attorney for Sun Surety Insurance Company 
211 East 300 South #216 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
